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In high-tech industries, one important method of diﬀusion is through employee mobility:
many of the entering ﬁrms are started by employees from incumbent ﬁrms using some of their
former employers’ technological know-how. This paper explores the eﬀect of incorporating this
mechanism in a general industry framework by allowing employees to imitate their employers’
know-how. The equilibrium is Pareto optimal since the employees “pay” for the possibility
of learning their employers’ know-how. The model’s implications are consistent with data
from the rigid disk drive industry. These implications concern the eﬀects of know-how on
ﬁrm formation and survival.
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In existing industry dynamic models (Gort and Klepper (1982) and Jovanovic and
MacDonald (1994b)), the mechanism through which knowledge diﬀuses is abstract. How-
ever, there is evidence of a speciﬁc mechanism in high-tech industries, where technological
knowledge is important and improvements occur continuously and rapidly. Many entrants are
actually spin-outs, ﬁrms started by a former employee of an incumbent ﬁrm. In Christensen’s
(1993) study of the rigid disk drive industry, he documents approximately 40 spin-outs in a
20 year period. These ﬁrms account for approximately 25% of the entering ﬁrms. In fact,
one ﬁrm, Shugart, had seven descendants, and of these, six were in operation in 1991 and in-
cluded the U.S. original equipment market’s four largest ﬁrms. This type of activity has also
been documented in the semiconductor industry. In the period from 1955 to 1976, at least 29
entering ﬁrms had at least one founder who worked for Fairchild Semiconductor (Braun and
MacDonald (1982)). Both of these are generic examples of high-tech industries. Here, we
propose an industry model that is consistent with the feature that agents can imitate their
employer’s knowledge and examine its implications. By specifying the particular mechanism,
we can study its eﬀects in a perfectly competitive framework similar to Hopenhayn (1992).
This would allow for better policy prescriptions as suggested in Irwin and Klenow (1994).
The model is related to Lucas’ Span-of-Control (1978), since higher knowledge in-
creases output. However, agents can improve their productivity either by working as a re-
searcher and imitating their employer or by running a ﬁrm and hiring researchers to innovate.
Essentially, there are two production processes at work: one which produces output and the
other which produces knowledge.
The model has implications concerning the relationship between knowledge and ﬁrmformation and survival. First, more technologically advanced ﬁrms will produce spin-outs.
Second, ﬁrms with higher technological know-how will survive in the following period with
a higher probability than those with lower technological know-how. Finally, a spin-out’s
probability of survival into its second period depends on the know-how of its parent.
These implications are compared with data from the hard drive industry. The hard
drive industry is an industry where technological know-how is important and rapid and
where innovation is constant. First, we show that the model is relevant for this industry:
spin-outs were the single most important type of entrant in the period 1977-1997 and used
know-how learned from their parent ﬁrms. There is support for the model’s implications on
spin-out generation and ﬁrm survival. One interesting fact is that ﬁrm size is not signiﬁcantly
correlated with the probability of spin-out generation. This suggests that while larger ﬁrms
may have more employees, only the better ones will generate spin-outs. Spin-out survival is
found to be more closely related to some forms of know-how possessed by parent ﬁrms than
others.
Several puzzling facts about the hard drive industry can be replicated and explained
with a simulation of the model. For example, Lerner (1997) establishes that in the 1970’s and
1980’s, while the industry was expanding, proﬁts were low and rose as the industry matured,
even though the price was steadily declining. During this time, technological laggards who
were close behind the leaders tended to catch up to leaders, and laggards who were further
behind were more likely to exit. The simulation results suggest that the model can explain
several of the broad trends that have occurred in the disk drive industry, and other high-tech
industries with similar trends, over time.
In contrast to previous models of technological diﬀusion, despite the fact that technol-
2ogy spills over from ﬁrms to spin-outs, the competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal. The
employees “pay” for the possibility of imitating their employers’ technological know-how,
because imitation is locationally speciﬁc and the agents who beneﬁtc a nb ei d e n t i ﬁed. In Jo-
vanovic and MacDonald (1994a), imitation depends only on the distribution of know-how in
the industry and not on the actions of the individuals. The lack of property rights can lead to
an externality and a suboptimal equilibrium. The optimality result presented here is similar
to that in Chari and Hopenhayn (1991). Unlike that model, the arrival of new technology is
endogenous and depends on actions undertaken by the agents in the economy. This suggests
that government policy is unwarranted to increase innovation and social welfare.
The paper is organized in the following manner. The second section presents the model
and theoretical results. The third section describes the rigid disk industry and compares the
data with the implications of the model. A simulation of the model is discussed in the fourth
section. The ﬁnal section concludes and explores possible avenues for future research.
2. The Model
The model describes the evolution of a single industry in a discrete time, inﬁnite
horizon environment. There is a continuum of ex ante homogeneous, inﬁnitely lived agents
in the industry. Each agent has a level of technological know-how, given by θ ∈ [θL,θH]. The
distribution of know-how at time t is given by νt (Θ), a probability measure, where ν0 is given
and Θ is the set [θL,θH].
At the beginning of each period, an agent observes his level of know-how and the
distribution of know-how within the industry. Each period, each agent decides whether to
work outside the industry, work in the industry as a researcher at an existing ﬁrm, or operate
3a ﬁrm in the industry. An agent who works outside the industry receives a wage, W0.T h i s
outside wage is constant over time. If an agent works outside the industry, his know-how
does not improve.
An agent who works as a researcher must decide for which ﬁrm to work. All researchers
are assumed to be identical in the innovation production function, and ﬁrms diﬀer only by
the level of know-how of their founder. A researcher with know-how θr who works for a ﬁrm
with know-how θf receives a wage w(θr,θf,ν). With probability λ, a researcher learns her
employer’s know-how. If the researcher worked for a ﬁrm with a lower level of know-how than
her own, she will keep her original level of know-how. Otherwise, the researcher will imitate
the ﬁrm’s know-how and may use it in the following period.
The ﬁrm’s choice variables are given by the vector (q,l),w h e r eq is the quantity
produced and l is the innovative eﬀort, given by the measure of researchers hired in each
period. Firms produce a homogeneous product and face an inverse demand curve, D(Q),
where Q is the aggregate quantity produced in the industry. For simplicity, the demand curve
is assumed to be constant over time.1 The ﬁrm’s net revenue is given by
p(ν)q − c(q,θ) − lw(θf,θr,ν).
The price of the good produced by the industry, in equilibrium, is determined by the
distribution of knowledge in the industry and the demand curve and is given by p(ν).T h e
costs are decomposed into the cost associated with production of the good and that associ-









dθ < 0,a n dlimq→∞ c0(q,θ)=∞,
1This model can be incorporated into a general equilibrium model, as in Mitchell (1999), where the demand
for the industry’s good is unaﬀected by income and the wages paid outside the industry are constant.
4∀θ ∈ Θ. The cost of innovation is the product of the number of researchers a ﬁrm hires, l,
and the wage rate paid by the ﬁrm, w(θf,θr,ν).
The transition function of the ﬁrm’s θ is given by a cumulative distribution function
Ψ(θ
0|l,θ) that measures the probability of obtaining future know-how θ
0 given current know-
how, θ,a n di n n o v a t i v ee ﬀort, l.I t i s not dependent on the distribution of agents, ν.T h e
properties of Ψ are
(i) Innovation is not guaranteed. (Ψ(θ|l,θ) > 0.)
(ii) Innovation is costly. (Ψ(θ|0,θ)=1.)




0|l,θ) is multiplicatively separable in l and θ.( Ψ(θ
0|l,θ)=F(θ
0|θ)G(l), where
G(l) is the probability that the ﬁrm obtains a new level of know-how given its innovative
eﬀort and F(θ
0|θ) is the cumulative distribution function of the ﬁrm’s next period know-how
given this period’s know-how, given that the ﬁrm obtains a new level of know-how.)
(v) Increasing eﬀort and know-how improves prospects. (If b θ ≥ θ, then F(θ
0|b θ) ﬁrst or-
der stochastically dominates F(θ




ﬁrst order stochastically dominates
G(l).)
(vi) G(l) is concave. (For any two levels of eﬀort, l1 and l2,a n dα ∈ [0,1],
G(αl1 +( 1 − α)l2) dominates αG(l1)+( 1 − α)G(l2) in the ﬁrst order stochastic sense.)
The ﬁrst three and ﬁfth assumptions are similar to those of Jovanovic and MacDonald
(1994a), but the imitative possibilities are suppressed. This isolates the mechanism through
which imitation occurs. The fourth assumption is used only to prove that the probability of
survival is weakly increasing in know-how. The ﬁnal condition on the innovation technology
5helps to guarantee that ﬁrms with the same technological know-how will choose to expend
t h es a m ee ﬀort given the same distribution of know-how, instead of randomizing between
diﬀerent levels of eﬀort.
Imitation between existing ﬁrms is not allowed in this model. Imitation occurs through
researchers who work within the industry. Firms can only learn by hiring researchers. Re-
searchers supply a homogeneous product to the ﬁrms. Any increase in θ is based on the ﬁrm’s
innovative eﬀort, its previous θ and the stochastic innovative shock.
Before the complete agent’s problem is presented, the law of motion for the distribution
of knowledge is presented.
A. The Law of Motion
The law of motion depends on the actions of the agents in the economy. The knowledge
of the agents who work outside the industry is unchanged. So, the future distribution will be
unaﬀected by their actions. In the case of agents who work as researchers within the industry,
the distribution will be unaﬀected by 1−λ of these agents who fail to learn their employers’
knowledge, while λ of these agents will learn their employers’ knowledge and aﬀect the next
period’s distribution as long as these researchers work for ﬁrms with knowledge that is greater
than their own. Finally, the plant owners will aﬀect the distribution given their choice of
innovative eﬀort.
The law of motion is written formally using the following three subsets. Which
agents are members of which subsets is determined by their actions. The measure of agents
who become ﬁrm owners is denoted by νP, the measure of agents who work as researchers
within the industry by νR and the measure of agents who work outside the industry by νW.
6Without loss of generality, each ﬁrm is assumed to hire only one type of researcher. So,
all researchers at a particular ﬁrm will have the same level of knowledge. In order to keep
account of how many agents are hired by which ﬁrms and both the ﬁrms’ and the agents’
type, the function z is used. The function z (l,θr,θf) is the measure of ﬁrms with θf that
hire l units of researchers with θr and has the following characteristics:
R
L×Θ z (dl × dθr × θf)=νP (θf)
R
L×Θ lz(dl × θr × dθf)=νR (θr)
R
L×Θ×Θ z (dl × dθr × dθf)=νP (Θ)
R
L×Θ×Θ lz(dl × dθr × dθf)=νR (Θ).
T h ef r a c t i o no fa g e n t sw i t hk n o w l e d g ee q u a lt oθ is given by ν (θ). So, νP (θf) is the measure
of plant owners with know-how θf, and νR (θr) is the measure of researchers with knowledge
θr. Recall that Θ is the set [θL,θH].
For any set A ⊂ Θ,
Φ(ν)(A)=νW (A)+( 1 − λ)
R
L×A×[θr,θH] lz(dl × dθr × dθf)
+
R
L×A×[θL,θr] lz(dl × dθr × dθf)
+λ
R
L×[θL,θf]×A lz(dl × dθr × dθf)+
R
Ψ(A|l,θ)dz.
The ﬁrst branch represents the measure of agents who worked outside the industry and whose
know-how was an element of the set A. The knowledge of these agents is unchanged. The
second branch simply represents those agents who had knowledge which was an element of the
set A, worked as researchers at ﬁrms with knowledge that was weakly greater than their own,
a n df a i l e dt ol e a r nt h e i re m p l o y e r ’ sk n o w l e d g e . T h et h i r db r a n c hi st h em e a s u r eo fa g e n t s
with initial knowledge in the set A and who worked as researchers for ﬁrms with knowledge
that was worse than their own. Since their knowledge was better than that of their employers,
7their knowledge in the following period will be unchanged. The fourth branch is the measure
of agents who worked in the previous period for ﬁrms within the industry with knowledge
that was weakly better than their own and imitated their employer’s know-how given that
their employer’s know-how was an element in the set A.T h eﬁnal branch is the measure of
those incorporated agents whose knowledge is within the set A, either as a result of innovative
eﬀort or because their knowledge in the previous period was an element in the set A and they
failed to innovate.
B. The Agent’s Complete Problem
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(1)
where β is the discount factor and V (θ,ν) is the value function. The ﬁrst branch is the return
from taking a job outside the industry. In this case, the agent’s knowledge is unchanged in
the following period. The second is the return from choosing to become a researcher in
the industry. In this case, the agent’s future knowledge becomes the same as that of his
employer with probability λ if the agent’s initial knowledge was less than his employer’s
knowledge. Otherwise, his knowledge remains unchanged. The last branch deﬁnes the return
8from becoming an incorporated agent. Here the agent’s future knowledge, θ
0,i sd e t e r m i n e d
by the transition function Ψ.
C. Equilibrium
Equilibrium is determined by agents optimizing and, once they have chosen whether
to work as workers or researchers or entrepreneurs, selecting optimal policies such that supply
equals demand for the industry’s product and for the researchers’ product. More formally,
equilibrium is a V and Φ(ν) with optimal policies (q,l,νW,νR,νP,z) and prices p(ν) and
wages, Wo and w(θr,θf), such that the following are true:
(i) Agents’ choices between running a ﬁrm, being a researcher and working outside the
industry are optimal given their θ and the industry state, ν.











In equilibrium, agents optimize. The price of the product produced by the industry
is set equal to the inverse industry demand given the distribution of know-how. The next
period’s distribution of know-how in the continuum is determined by which ﬁrms in the
industry innovated in the current period in addition to which researchers imitated their
employer’s knowledge in the current period, given that these agents are acting optimally.
Supply of labor for a particular ﬁrm is set equal to labor demanded by the ﬁrm type speciﬁc
wage, and the supply of ﬁr m si se q u a lt ot h ed e m a n df o rﬁrms.
9This equilibrium is a special case of the one presented in Jovanovic and Rosenthal
(1988). Since there is no aggregate uncertainty and the suﬃcient conditions for such equilib-
rium to exist are satisﬁed, this equilibrium exists.
D. Wage Structure
In this subsection, we consider the structure of wages within the industry and the
evolution of both the distribution of knowledge and the price of the industry’s product. All
proofs are left to the Appendix.
Proposition 1:F o ra n yt w oﬁrms i and j,w i t hk n o w - h o wθi and θj, respectively, which
hire l>0 o ft h es a m et y p eo fr e s e a r c h e r sw i t hk n o w l e d g eθr, such that θi ≥ θr and θj ≥ θr,
w(θr,θi)+βλV (θi,Φ(ν)) = w(θr,θj)+βλV (θj,Φ(ν)).
This Proposition shows that agents who work as researchers would be willing to receive
a lower wage for working at a ﬁrm with a higher technology compared to a ﬁrm with a
lower technology. As long as agents can imitate their employer’s technology with positive
probability and value the future, the lower wages paid by ﬁrms with higher technology is
compensated by the future return. Firms with the highest available technology oﬀer the
highest return to their employers in the future, by increasing their ability to leave with their
employer’s know-how and become entrepreneurs. If either the agent does not value the future
or cannot imitate his employer’s technology, then the wages paid by two ﬁrms with diﬀerent
technologies would be the same.
Proposition 2: If there are any two agents with θr, where one works outside the
10industry and the other works as a researcher at a ﬁrm with θf,t h e n
w(θr,θf)+βλV (θf,Φ(ν)) = W
o + βλV (θr,Φ(ν))
where θf ≥ θr.
Obviously, ﬁrms with the highest available technology will pay a wage signiﬁcantly
below the outside wage, as long as researchers have a positive probability of imitating and
value the future. This diﬀerence is simply equal to the diﬀerence between the present ex-
pected value of having imitated the ﬁrm’s know-how and the present expected value of the
agent’s original level of know-how. If workers do not value the future or cannot imitate their
employers’ technology, then the wage paid by any ﬁrm within the industry must be the same
as the outside wage in order to attract workers. This suggests that employees are “paying”
their employers for the possibility of learning their know-how in order to imitate it.
Because there is no forgetting for either a ﬁrm owner or any worker, the distribu-
tion of knowledge in the industry is weakly improving. Further, the distribution eventually
approaches a steady state, which depends on the initial distribution. For some initial distri-
butions, there may be no change. The price is weakly decreasing. This is due to the fact
that the knowledge within the industry is improving and demand is constant.2
E. Optimality of the Competitive Equilibrium
In the language of dynamic programming, this is a stationary model, since the reward
function, the discount factor and transition function are all constant and independent of time.
The resulting equilibrium is unique in terms of prices and aggregate allocations. However,
2For a formal statement of these results, see the Appendix.
11while the aggregate allocations are unique, the individual choices may not be. For instance,
an individual agent may be indiﬀerent between working for any one of the ﬁrms with positive
demand for researchers and working at the outside alternative. Where such an agent chooses
to work is not important; what is important is the aggregate allocation of agents to ﬁrms.
Optimality of the Competitive Equilibrium
The planner’s problem is deﬁned. The optimal program maximizes the present ex-
pected value of the sum of the consumer surplus and the producer surplus. Again, the single














c(q,θ)dνPt− WoνRt − W oνPt
¢
s. t. {νPt,νRt,νWt,z t}
∞
t=0 is feasible given ν0
where S is the consumer surplus given the aggregate output,
R
c(q,θ)dνPt is the aggregate
cost of producing the aggregate level of output, WoνRt is the opportunity cost of hiring re-
searchers instead of allowing them to work at the outside option, and W oνPtis the opportunity
cost of hiring managers for the plants.
Proposition 3: The competitive equilibrium is optimal and unique.
Since ﬁrms have property rights to their knowledge and there is no asymmetric infor-
mation about ﬁrms’ knowledge, the diﬀusion externality is internalized and the competitive
equilibrium is optimal. In Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994a), the ﬁrm’s learning technology
is a function of the distribution of knowledge within the industry. As a result, the equilibrium
is suboptimal. Firms would choose to engage in a lower than optimal level of learning because
of the lack of property rights over knowledge.
12Since there is no asymmetric information about ﬁrms’ knowledge, the wage paid to
researchers is a decreasing function of the ﬁrms’ knowledge. This contrasts with Jovanovic and
Nyarko (1995), where the wage paid by ﬁr m si st h es a m e .I ft h i sm o d e la l l o w e df o ra s y m m e t r i c
information over ﬁrms’ knowledge, wages would not depend on the ﬁrm’s knowledge, only
the average level of knowledge across ﬁrms.
One further statement can be made about the equilibrium. Because λ represents the
cost or barrier to imitation, we can say the following.
Corollary 1: Social welfare is increasing in λ.
This is a direct result of the fact that the optimality of the competitive equilibrium
is independent of λ. If the social planner were allowed to pick the value of λ,s h ew o u l ds e t
λ equal to one, since this would imply that there were no barrier to imitation. Diﬀusion of
current knowledge would be immediate.
F. Firm Generation and Survival
Any agent who has not incorporated and has failed to improve his knowledge will not
incorporate in the future. This is shown by using the planner’s solution. Since an agent
who either operated a ﬁrm or imitated her employer’s knowledge can produce output more
eﬃciently and improve the distribution of knowledge more than one who did neither, the
planner would choose the former as a ﬁrm owner. Given this, there is a critical value, ˜ θ,s u c h
that any agent with knowledge greater than this critical value will operate a ﬁrm. Because
the distribution of knowledge is improving, the critical value is increasing over time. The
critical value helps to characterize the value function. The value function is constant for any
13level of knowledge below the critical value and is increasing above it.3
The next three results are compared with the data from the rigid drive industry in the
following section. The ﬁr s tr e s u l ts h o w st h a tﬁrms with greater technological know-how are
more likely to generate spin-outs.
Proposition 4: There exists a critical value, ˜ θ
0
,s u c ht h a tf o ra n yﬁrm i with θi ≤ ˜ θ
0
,
none of its researchers will become a ﬁrm owner in the following period and any ﬁrm j with
θj > ˜ θ
0
, λl(θj) of its researchers will become ﬁrm owners.
The next result shows that ﬁrms with higher know-how are more likely to survive.
Proposition 5: The probability that an agent who currently operates a ﬁrm will con-
tinue to operate a ﬁrm in the following period is weakly increasing in his know-how.
Even though the likelihood of survival is increasing in know-how, leapfrogging is still
possible in the model because of the stochastic learning technology. Leapfrogging is discussed
further below in Section 4.
The ﬁnal result shows that the probability of a spin-out surviving beyond its ﬁrst year
is increasing in its parent’s know-how.
Corollary 2: The probability that an agent who imitates his former employer’s tech-
nology and starts up a ﬁrm will operate a ﬁrm in the following period is weakly increasing in
his former employer’s know-how.
3For a formal statement and proof, see the Appendix.
143. The Rigid Disk Drive Industry
A. The Data
The main data source is the Disk/Trend Report on Rigid Disk Drives (Porter (1977-
1997)). The data set contains 192 ﬁrms, 1190 ﬁrm/year observations, and 11,644 model/year
observations. The data include product characteristics and introduction dates. Annual sales
of disk drives are reported for several ﬁrms.4 Information on the backgrounds of founders of
new ﬁrms is provided, and historical information and recent news are summarized for each
ﬁrm. To determine spin-out-parent relationships, the histories from the Disk/Trend Report
were supplemented with company press releases and articles provided by James Porter, the
editor of the Disk/Trend Report. Other sources include the Directory of Corporate Aﬃlia-
tions, the International Directory of Company Histories, and Christensen (1993).
There are 40 cases of one or more employees leaving one or more rigid disk drive
manufacturers to found a new ﬁrm in the period 1977-1997. Table 1 sorts the spin-outs by
year of entry and lists the parent ﬁrms, the founding year of the spin-out, and the spin-out’s
life span and mode of exit.5 To determine the parent ﬁrms, we focus on the background
of the founders and not on other employees, for which data are unavailable. The implicit
assumption is that founders had considerable inﬂuence on the products and strategies of the
start-up; evidence from company press releases and the Disk/Trend Report supports this
assumption. We categorize mode of exit three ways: ﬁrms are still active as of 1997, have
been acquired, or have exited due to failure. The distinction between acquisition and failure
4Sales of other products, including licenses and disk drive components, are not included in the measure of
disk sales. Only sales of drives are counted.
5The analysis uses data starting in the late ’70’s, after the industry was well into its takeoﬀ stage. All of the
non-captive parent ﬁrms of the early start-ups in the data were also spin-outs (Christensen (1993)). Memorex,
Pertec, and Storage Technology Corporation were IBM spin-outs, Shugart Associates was a Memorex spin-out,
and Tandon was a Pertec spin-out.
15is important because acquired ﬁrms are typically not failing. In our analysis below we treat
exits due to acquisitions as censored observations.
In order to test the theoretical implications on spin-out generation and ﬁrm survival, we
use the available data to construct two measures of know-how. Technical know-how measures
the ﬁrm’s technical expertise using areal densities. The areal density is the main measure of
drive quality; it measures how much information can be stored on each square inch of disk.
The areal density of the ﬁrm’s best drive in each diameter in each year is divided by the
highest areal density in that diameter in that year to generate a measure of the ﬁrm’s know-
how in each diameter relative to the best available know-how in that diameter.6 Then this
measure is averaged across diameters to obtain a single measure of the ﬁrm’s technical know-
h o wi ne a c hy e a r .T h eﬁrm-level measure is necessary because the theoretical results pertain
to ﬁrm-level decision-making.7 Early mover know-how is a dummy variable for ﬁrms that
introduced a drive of a new diameter within the ﬁr s ty e a rt h a td r i v e so ft h a td i a m e t e rw e r e
shipped. Early mover know-how is a proxy for the product design, product reliability, and
marketing know-how associated with designing, manufacturing, and marketing new drives.
Only the major diameters introduced in 1977-1997 are considered: the 8”, 5.25”, 3.5”, 2.5”,
and 1.8” drives.
Intellectual property rights are one issue that has not been speciﬁcally addressed in
the model. Empirically, institutional barriers to imitation appear to be low in the disk drive
6Only drives that have been shipped are used when making these calculations. Drives that have been
announced but not yet put into production are not included. We assume that improvements in technical
know-how are rapidly embodied in new products. Lerner (1997) argues convincingly that this is the case in
the disk drive industry.
7Lerner treats each diameter separately in most of his analysis but reports some results using this average
measure.
16industry. Lerner provides evidence that patents were not widely used to protect key aspects
of drive technology, and examples in the Disk/Trend Report show that when patents were
used, licensing was widespread. Further, covenants not to compete and trade secret laws were
largely ineﬀective. Most of the ﬁrms in this study were located in California, where covenants
not to compete were prohibited by law and not enforced by the courts. Trade secret laws did
not create much of an employee mobility barrier because of large contract negotiation costs,
diﬃculties with enforcing the laws, and the Silicon Valley culture.8
B. The Industry’s History
We refer the interested reader to Christensen (1993, 1997), Lerner (1997), and the
Disk/Trend Report for more complete descriptions of the industry’s history. The industry
began in 1956 when IBM introduced the ﬁrst rigid disk drive. Followers began entering
in the 1960’s and were of two main types. Captive producers, such as Burroughs, Control
Data, and Univac, were vertically integrated computer manufacturers that produced drives
for in-house use. Plug-compatible market (PCM) ﬁrms were independent drive producers
that made drives that were plug-compatible with IBM’s computers. PCM ﬁrms sold drives
directly to users of IBM computers. Christensen (1993) reports that many of the early PCM
ﬁrms were IBM spin-outs, including Century Data, Memorex, Pertec and Storage Technology
Corporation. When the minicomputer market began growing rapidly in the mid 1970’s, an
original equipment market (OEM) emerged. OEM ﬁrms served as either primary or secondary
sources of drives for computer manufacturers.
Innovation and imitation in the disk drive industry occurred at an extremely rapid
8Gilson (1998) and Saxenian (1994) discuss covenants not to compete and trade secret law in the Silicon
Valley environment.
17rate from 1956 to 1997 and took several forms. First, several improvements in technical
features improved capacities and access times. Second, several improvements in design and
manufacturing techniques improved costs and reliability. Third, several architectural innova-
tions occurred: drives with smaller diameters were introduced beginning with 8” and 5.25”
drives in the late ’70’s and continuing with 3.5”, 2.5”, and 1.8” drives. When ﬁrst introduced,
the new drives served new buyers: 8”, 5.25”, 3.5”, 2.5”, and 1.8” drives were ﬁrst used in
minicomputers, personal computers, portable computers, notebook computers, and smaller
portable devices, respectively. In response to the proﬁt opportunities generated from rapid
technological change and market growth, net entry occurred. Firm numbers continued to rise
until the mid ’80’s and then leveled oﬀ a short time before falling in the early ’90’s (Lerner).
The patterns for net entry and ﬁrm numbers are similar to those established in industries
with new products in Gort and Klepper (1982).
Spin-outs: Importance and Imitation
In the model spin-outs are the only source of entry. Focusing on U.S. disk drive ﬁrms in
the period 1976-1989, Christensen (1993) shows that while spin-outs were not the only source
of entry, they were deﬁnitely the most important source. Only three out of 28 non-spin-out
entrants survived until 1989, but 16 out of 40 spin-outs survived. Spin-outs accounted for
all but four of the start-ups that were successful at generating revenue and accounted for
99.4 percent of the total cumulative revenues generated by the start-up group. By 1989
s e v e no ft h ew o r l dO E M / P C Mm a r k e t ’ st e nl a r g e s tﬁrms were spin-outs. Our data show that
after 1989 only ﬁve spin-outs and two non-spin-outs entered. This implies that Christensen’s
detailed analysis describes the vast majority of the entrants.
18Spin-outs were an important source of entry, but were they imitators? Did spin-outs
imitate ﬁrm-speciﬁc know-how of their former employer, as in the model, or did they simply
learn industry-speciﬁc know-how?9 The Disk/Trend Report describes several examples of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc technical know-how being imitated. For example, founders of Amcodyne and
Areal Technology learned how to make high areal density drives from their parent ﬁrms,
founders of Dastek used thin ﬁlm head technology after learning from IBM, and founders of
Tecstor modeled their drives after their parent’s drives.
Early mover know-how was also imitated. Table 2 lists early movers by diameter.
Almost all of the ﬁrms listed are either spin-outs, parents, or both, with the exception of
BASF, New World Computer, and Control Data.10 Many of the ﬁrms are related to each
other. Table 3 lists the spin-outs from early mover parents along with whether the spin-out
was an early mover and, if so, in which diameter. From Table 3, the probability that a
randomly selected spin-out from an early mover parent is an early mover is 5
15 = .33. Of
the 177 ﬁrms that were not spin-outs from early-mover parents, only 12 were early movers,
resulting in a probability of .068. The two probabilities diﬀer substantially, and the diﬀerence
is signiﬁcant at the 1% level: the t statistic is 3.5 and the critical value is 2.33.11
Other types of know-how related to product reliability, low cost, and marketing, which
9Some alternative models from the labor economics literature, though not speciﬁcally developed to explain
spin-outs, may provide some possible alternative explanations of spin-out formation. The model presented
here is similar to a stepping stone mobility model, in which an agent works at one ﬁrm and acquires skills that
allow him to move up the career ladder, possibly at another ﬁrm. In contrast, a standard matching model
suggests that employee departures occur as a result of a bad match. If such a model was used to describe
spin-out formation, there would be no connection between the parent ﬁrm’s know-how and the spin-out’s
know-how.
10Many of these ﬁrms were extremely successful. International Memories, the ﬁrst mover in 8” drives,
became one of the most prominent OEM manufacturers in the early ’80’s. Seagate, the ﬁrst mover in 5.25”
drives, rapidly became the most prominent OEM ﬁrm and continued to hold this position as of 1997.
11If we include Syquest, a spin-out of Seagate and a pioneer of the small disk cartridge drive market, as an
early mover, the point estimates become even more compelling. Syquest is excluded because our test includes
only early movers in the main diameters.
19cannot be measured using our data, also appear to have been imitated. Conner Peripherals,
Seagate, and Quantum are prominent examples of spin-outs with strengths in these areas
whose parents had similar strengths.
In contrast to our model, in some cases spin-outs were both imitators and innovators.
A particularly striking example of this is that the ﬁrst ﬁrms to introduce the major new
diameters were all spin-outs: International Memories, Seagate, Rodime, PrairieTek, and
Integral Peripherals. Christensen points out that it may have been easier for spin-outs to
ﬁnd new customers, convince them to buy new drives, and maintain focus on a new, small
market because spin-outs did not face the same opportunity costs as their larger parents who
were focused on existing markets. This is an interesting departure from the model that could
be explored in future work.
Spin-out Formation
According to the model spin-outs come from ﬁrms with relatively high know-how. This
hypothesis is tested using several probit models. The dependent variable is a dummy variable
that takes the value 1 if the ﬁrm generates a spin-out in the current year. In the model the
probability of a ﬁrm generating a spin-out in period t depends only on the ﬁrm’s know-how
in period t − 1 and the distribution of know-how. Therefore, the independent variables are
lagged values of technical know-how and early mover know-how. We use year dummies to
account for changes in the distribution of know-how from year to year.12 Summary statistics
are presented in Table 4.
The list of spin-out parents in Table 1 includes many of the most successful disk drive
12Note that year dummies capture all changes in industry-level variables from year to year. In the model,
all industry-level changes depend on changes in the distribution of know-how. We use 1983 as a base year.
20ﬁrms. If success was due to “know-how,” however deﬁned, then these ﬁrms clearly had high
know-how. Thus, even without using explicit know-how measures, the hypothesis appears
to have some support. The statistical analysis conﬁr m st h i si m p r e s s i o n . T h ee s t i m a t i o n
results are reported in Table 5. In equation 5a both know-how coeﬃcients are positive and
signiﬁcant.13 This supports the hypothesis. The magnitude of the eﬀects are quite large:
at the mean values of the data, obtaining early mover know-how raises the probability of
generating a spin-out from 0.13 to 0.19, and raising technical know-how from 0.25 to 0.75
raises the probability of generating a spin-out from 0.11 to 0.18.
Equation 5b is similar to equation 5a but includes two additional control variables:
lagged sales growth and the lagged number of drives produced.14 Including these variables
allows us to test two alternative explanations for spin-out formation. Lagged sales growth
allows us to test whether spin-outs formed as a result of employee exit from a failing ﬁrm.15
The coeﬃcient on lagged sales growth is positive, which suggests that spin-outs are more likely
to come from ﬁrms that are doing well in the market rather than those that are retrenching
13This was checked for robustness by limiting the sample to U.S. ﬁrms. The motivation for considering only
U.S. ﬁr m si st h a to n l yU . S .ﬁrms generated spin-outs in the disk drive industry. It is likely that institutional
diﬀerences between the U.S. and Japan, the country in which most foreign ﬁrms were based, made spin-out
generation more likely in the U.S. The results are essentially unchanged.






where gt denotes the growth rate and st denotes ﬁrm sales in period t. This formula ensures that gt is ﬁnite
if either st or st−1 is 0. For new entrants that have 0 sales in two adjacent periods, gt is set equal to zero. If
a spin-out has two parents, the average of the parents’ sales data is used.
15This test is partly motivated by a few cases in Table 1 in which spin-out formation occurred when a
once prominent parent suddenly declined. In 1985-86, Computer Memories lost its largest customer when
IBM decided to supply more of its needs in-house. As Computer Memories declined employees left and two
spin-outs were formed: Peripheral Technology and Brand Technologies. In another case when Lapine failed
after its brief success, employees abandoned it and founded new ﬁrms: Comport and Kalok. The learning
described by the model may still have been present, but the departure was partly forced rather than entirely
voluntary.
21or declining. The lagged number of drives is a proxy for ﬁrm size. A simple hypothesis about
spin-out generation is that spin-outs are more likely to come from larger ﬁrms simply because
larger ﬁrms have more employees who can leave. This result does not support this simple
hypothesis; the coeﬃcient on lagged number of drives is negative and insigniﬁcant.16
Firm Survival
The second implication of the model is that the probability of a ﬁrm surviving until
the following period is increasing in its current know-how. This hypothesis is tested using
several probit models. If a ﬁrm exits in period t because it is acquired, the exit year is treated
as censored; only failures count as exits.
The estimation results are reported in Table 6. In equation 6a both know-how coeﬃ-
cients are positive.17 This supports the hypothesis. The magnitudes of both know-how eﬀects
are substantial. At the mean values of the data, obtaining early-mover know-how raises the
probability of surviving from 0.78 to 0.82, and raising technical know-how from 0.25 to 0.75
raises the probability of surviving from 0.75 to 0.84.
In the theoretical model, once spin-outs have been formed they are assumed to evolve
according to the same transition rules as other ﬁrms. To conﬁrm that this is a reasonable
assumption, Table 7 repeats the regression from Table 6 including only spin-outs. Equation 7a
shows that the results are similar to Table 6. In equation 7b, parent know-how measures are
included as control variables. In the model, only the current know-how and the distribution
of know-how aﬀect ﬁrm survival. Clearly, this assumption is violated in the data because
the coeﬃcients on parent know-how are both signiﬁcant. Parent know-how appears to have
16This was checked for robustness by limiting the sample to U.S. ﬁrms. The results were unaﬀected.
17The robustness is checked by limiting the sample to U.S. ﬁrms. The results are essentially unchanged.
22persistent eﬀects. Interestingly, the coeﬃcient on parent technical know-how is negative. We
discuss this result further below.
Spin-out Survival
The ﬁnal implication states that a spin-out’s likelihood of surviving beyond its ﬁrst pe-
riod is increasing in its parent’s know-how. Unfortunately this does not lead to an interesting
test, because all the spin-outs in the data except two survived beyond their ﬁrst year. Instead,
a more general hypothesis is tested: a spin-out’s expected lifetime is increasing in its parent’s
know-how. This is done using duration models in which the spin-out’s lifetime is a function
of its parent’s know-how. Summary statistics on spin-out lifetimes, parent know-how, and
the other included variables are provided in Table 8.
Several duration models were estimated; the best ﬁt was obtained from a Weibull
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The resulting hazard function, which gives the probability that a ﬁrm exits given that it has






The parameters β and σ a r et ob ee s t i m a t e d ,a n dxi represents ﬁrm i’s parent’s know-how.18
18We treat spin-outs that were still alive in 1997 and those that were acquired before 1997 as censored
observations. While checking the robustness of the results, we estimated a Markov chain model that allowed
23Estimation results are reported in Table 9. In equation 9a only the two parent know-
how measures are included. Although the signs are the same as in equation 7b,b o t hc o e f -
ﬁcients are insigniﬁcant. In equation 9b more precise estimates are obtained using a 3-year
average of parent technical know-how. The coeﬃcient is still negative, while the coeﬃcient
on early mover know-how is positive. The results conﬁrm the conclusions from equation 7b:
spin-out survival is decreasing in parent technical know-how. However, as shown in Table
7, the probability of a spin-out surviving is increasing in its own technical know-how. The
results suggest that technical know-how was more diﬃcult to imitate than early mover know-
how. Spin-outs that came from ﬁrms with high technical know-how were less likely to imitate
successfully and therefore were less likely to survive, but if they were successful at learning
this type of know-how, they were more likely to survive. Christensen’s (1993) analysis sup-
ports this conclusion. Many of the advances that improved areal densities were extremely
expensive and time-consuming to develop, and only the large established ﬁrms were successful
with these development projects. New small ﬁrms that tried had an extremely high failure
rate.
In equation 9c parent sales growth is added as an explanatory variable. As mentioned
above, some spin-outs were formed when the parent was failing. The estimates of equation
9c show that spin-outs from failing ﬁrms were less likely to have long lives than those from
growing ﬁrms. The coeﬃcients on parent know-how do not change substantially.
Another type of spin-out formation involved entrepreneur mobility: in several cases
for the two types of censoring explicitly. The results did not change: it appears that general statements about
how the probability of being acquired depends on know-how and our other controls cannot be made. This
conclusion makes sense given the history of the industry. All types of ﬁrms have been acquired, including new
small ﬁrms still in the development stage, large successful ﬁrms, and failing ﬁrms have occurred throughout
the life cycle.
24in Table 1, one or more of the spin-out founders were also founders of the parent ﬁrm.19
This suggests that expertise in founding start-ups, as well as other types of know-how, was
useful. This entrepreneurial know-how is less likely to diﬀuse in the manner featured in the
model because it is more likely to be obtained from experience at founding start-ups than
from working for other ﬁrms. In equation 9d, we include an entrepreneur dummy.I fo n eo f
the spin-out founders was also a founder of the parent ﬁrm, this dummy takes the value of 1.
Interestingly, the coeﬃcient on the entrepreneur dummy is negative. Although the estimate is
imprecise, it suggests that past experience at founding start-ups may have a negative impact
on the lifetime of a new start-up. This result is similar to that documented in the PC software
industry by Prusa and Schmitz (1994). This may be the case in rapidly evolving industries:
past experience at founding a start-up may not be as important as having the right know-how
for the current environment.
4. Simulation
In this section, we simulate the model to show how it reconciles three main facts about
the disk drive industry’s evolution described by Christensen (1993, 1997) and Lerner (1997).
First, entry and spin-out formation peaked in the early ’80’s. Second, industry proﬁts were
low in the late ’70’s and later rose in the ’80’s and ’90’s as the market matured, even though
the price per megabyte was declining. Third, during this period laggards had a systematic
tendency to innovate more than leaders.
19These spin-outs were Micropolis, Irwin International, Seagate, Applied Information Memories, Maxtor,
Syquest, Epelo, Brand Technologies, Conner Peripherals, PrairieTek, Areal Technology, and Ecol.2. In two
cases, Irwin International and Seagate, the spin-out founder sold the parent ﬁrm before founding the new
ﬁrm. In the case of Brand Technologies, the spin-out founder left a failing ﬁrm to found a new one. In all of
the other cases, the founder left a viable ﬁrm to found a spin-out.
25Functional forms and parameter values used in the simulation were chosen to roughly
match the broad trends in entry and proﬁts in the data. Figures 1 through 8 graph various
simulated series. There are three levels of know-how: low-tech, medium-tech, or high-tech,
denoted by θl, θm, and θh, respectively. This isolates imitation: low-tech researchers can
imitate medium-tech ﬁrms, but no other imitation occurs. No agent can improve his know-
how by working for a low-tech ﬁrm, and the parameter values ensure that high-tech ﬁrms do
not hire researchers.20
We assign the following values: θl = 1, θm =4 , θh =5 ,W 0 =0 .15, β =0 .9, and





The market demand function is linear:
Q =2− 2.5p.
The ﬁrm’s transition function is speciﬁed as follows. Firms obtain a new θ with a probability
that depends on their labor usage, determined according to the function
0.4l0.9 if 0.4l0.9 ≤ 1,
1 otherwise,
where l represents the ﬁrm’s labor choice. Low-tech ﬁrms that obtain a new θ become
medium-tech agents with probability .5, become high-tech agents with probability .1,a n d
20Because high-tech ﬁrms have the highest possible know-how, they have no incentive to hire researchers.
However, under some parameter values equilibrium can involve all non-high-tech agents working for the high-
tech ﬁrms for free in order to have the chance to imitate. In this case imitation occurs, but no innovation
occurs.
26remain low-tech agents otherwise. Medium-tech ﬁrms that obtain a new θ become high-tech
agents with probability .5 and remain medium-tech agents otherwise.
Figure 2 shows that as know-how improves, net entry occurs and reaches its peak
by the tenth period; this roughly matches the trend in net entry in the disk drive industry.
In fact, the trend in net entry matches up well with that established in Gort and Klepper
(1982), where they assembled data on the historical development of 46 new products. There,
entering ﬁrms come with knowledge from outside the industry. Even with a signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent mechanism for diﬀusion, the trends are still apparent. Figure 3 shows the percentage
of agents that work as researchers. Low-tech researchers at medium-tech ﬁrms imitate at a
rate of 10% and start up new medium-tech ﬁrms in the following period. Most spin-outs are
formed in the fourth through tenth periods. These periods correspond to the early to mid
1980’s, when most of the disk drive spin-outs were formed.
The simulation also matches the evolution in prices and proﬁts in the hard drive
industry. Figure 5 shows that as know-how improves, the price and average cost fall and the
market quantity rises. This matches the pattern of falling cost per megabyte that occurred in
the industry. We report two proﬁts e r i e st h a ta l l o wf o rd i ﬀerent R&D accounting methods.21
Figure 4 shows that R&D expenditures per ﬁrm, which depend on how many researchers are
employed, are initially high and fall over time. Figure 6 graphs revenue minus production costs
and R&D expenses, and ﬁgure 7 graphs revenue minus production costs. The basic pattern
of rising average proﬁts occurs in both series. Gort and Klepper (1982) claim that periods
of high net entry, falling price, and rising quantity are typically associated with innovations
21Much R&D activity in ﬁrms in rapidly evolving industries is not considered separately from other costs;
every employee may play a role in improving products and processes. Therefore, reported proﬁts likely include
some of what is R&D in the model as part of production costs.
27generated outside the industry. The simulation demonstrates that this is not always the case;
all of the entrants are spin-outs that obtain their know-how from their parent ﬁrms.
The results also match the pattern of laggards innovating more rapidly. Low-tech ﬁrms
become high-tech at faster rates than medium-tech ﬁrms do in periods 2 and 3. This does not
always occur; in periods 4 and 5, medium-tech ﬁrms innovate at faster rates. Leapfrogging
can occur in the model because the ﬁrm’s learning technology is stochastic and depends on
investment levels: if low-tech ﬁrms invest much more than medium-tech ﬁrms, then they
innovate at higher rates. Low-tech ﬁrms have higher costs of innovation because they must
pay higher wages to researchers but may have higher expected beneﬁts, because in comparison
to medium-tech ﬁrms their values are much lower than those of high-tech ﬁrms. This can be
seen in ﬁgure 8, which shows the value of agents by type. The diﬀerence in value between low-
tech and medium-tech agents is always larger than that between medium-tech and high-tech
agents.
5. Conclusion
Nearly 25% of the entering ﬁrms in the rigid disk drive industry were spin-outs (see
Christensen (1993) and Porter (1977-1997)). This is a signiﬁcant and important portion of
entering ﬁrms. In order to understand the eﬀects of this imitation mechanism on industry
dynamics, a model was developed.
The model provides insight into the role that this particular mechanism plays in an
industry’s evolution and, along with the empirical and simulation results, challenges some
long standing ideas. For example, the empirical evidence shows that, at least in the disk
drive industry and possibly in other industries, existing ﬁrms provided a training ground for
28employees who later left to found new start-ups. This contrasts with Gort and Klepper’s
(1982) model, where new ﬁrms used technology from outside the industry. The theoretical
implications that were compared with the data include new ﬁrm generation, ﬁrm survival
and spin-out survival and their relation to know-how. The data show that ﬁrms with higher
know-how are more likely to survive and to generate spin-outs, which is in agreement with
the model. One surprising fact is that ﬁrm size is not a good predictor of spin-out generation.
Finally, parental technical know-how is not a good predictor of spin-out survival, while early
mover know-how is. This may capture the diﬃculty of imitating technical know-how.
In contrast to other models of diﬀusion, such as Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994a), the
resulting competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal. This result establishes that the equilibria
of models of diﬀusion with active learning can be eﬃcient when imitation is allowed. It also
suggests that public policies that aﬀect employee mobility could have important eﬀects on
ﬁrm entry and technological diﬀusion in industries where know-how is an important factor of
production. Since social welfare is increasing with the probability of imitation, these policies
may ultimately have a detrimental eﬀect on social welfare. One possible avenue for future
research would be to structurally estimate this model to see how diﬀerent the probability
of imitation is between Massachusetts and California, where the laws regarding employee
mobility diﬀer greatly. This could also provide us with some insight into how much this
imitation possibility eﬀects welfare.
While this paper only compared the model’s implications with data from the rigid disk
drive industry, there is reason to believe that the employee mobility model captures some of
the salient features of other high-tech industries. The semiconductor and computer software
industries are typiﬁed by high employee mobility (See Braun and MacDonald (1982), SEMI
29(1986) and Wilson, Ashton and Egan (1980)). A stylized fact from both of these industries
is that better ﬁrms tend to generate more spin-outs. This suggests that there are similarities
between these industries and the hard drive industry. As in the rigid disk drive industry, the
price of semiconductors has been decreasing over time, while the proﬁts in the industry have
increased. This can be explained using a simulation of the model. This suggests that this
model is general enough to provide a framework to understand other high-tech industries.
30Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1: All researchers are a homogeneous input in innovative eﬀort.
Consider a researcher m with knowledge θm working at an arbitrary ﬁrm i with know-how
θi,w h e r eθi ≥ θm. The worker’s return for working at ﬁrm i is given by
w(θm,θi)+β[λV (θi,Φ(ν)) + (1 − λ)V (θm,Φ(ν))].
In order for worker m to be weakly indiﬀerent between working for ﬁrm i and any arbitrary
ﬁrm j in the industry with know-how θj ≥ θm, the following must hold:
w(θm,θi)+β[λV (θi,Φ(ν)) + (1 − λ)V (θm,Φ(ν))] ≥
w(θm,θj)+β[λV (θj,Φ(ν)) + (1 − λ)V (θm,Φ(ν))] ∀j 6= i.
This simpliﬁes to
w(θm,θi)+βλV (θi,Φ(ν)) ≥ w(θm,θj)+βλV (θj,Φ(ν)).
Next, consider the case of a researcher n working at an arbitrary ﬁrm j with θj, where θj ≥ θn.
Like researcher m, the following condition must be satisﬁed for him to be weakly indiﬀerent
between working at that ﬁrm j a n da na r b i t r a r yﬁrm i with θi ≥ θm:
w(θn,θj)+β[λV (θj,Φ(ν)) + (1 − λ)V (θn,Φ(ν))] ≥
w(θn,θi)+β[λV (θi,Φ(ν)) + (1 − λ)V (θn,Φ(ν))] ∀i 6= j.
Again, this simpliﬁes to
w(θn,θj)+βλV (θj,Φ(ν)) ≥ w(θn,θi)+βλV (θi,Φ(ν)).
Recall that by assumption, both of these researchers have the same knowledge. By replacing
θm and θn with θr, these two conditions imply Proposition 1,s i n c eb o t hi and j are arbitrary.¤
Lemma 1a: The value function is non-decreasing in θ.
31Corollary 1a: The wage w(θr,θf) is non-increasing in θf.
Proof of Proposition 2: First, consider the case where a ﬁrm with θf hires a researcher
with θn,w h e r eθf ≥ θn. In order for the researcher to strictly prefer working for the ﬁrm
rather than working at the outside alternative, the following condition must hold:
w(θn,θf)+β [λV (θf,Φ(ν)) + (1 − λ)V (θn,Φ(ν))] >W
o + βV (θn,Φ(ν)).
This simpliﬁes to
w(θn,θf)+βλV (θf,Φ(ν)) >W
o + βλV (θn,Φ(ν)).
Second, consider the case where an agent m with θm ﬁnds that the outside opportunity is
more attractive than working for a ﬁrm with θf,w h e r eθf ≥ θm.T h i si m p l i e st h a t
w(θm,θf)+β [λV (θf,Φ(ν)) + (1 − λ)V (θm,Φ(ν))] <W
o + βV (θm,Φ(ν)).
This simpliﬁes to
w(θf)+βλV (θf,Φ(ν)) <W
o + βλV (θn,Φ(ν)).
Recall that by assumption, the agents’ levels of know-how are equivalent. By replacing both
θn and θm with θr, these two conditions imply the proposition.¤
Proposition 1a:
(i) Φ(ν) weakly dominates ν.
(ii) Given ν0, the equilibrium sequence, {νt}, converges to a distribution, ν∗.
Proof of Proposition 1a: (i) Recall that Φ(ν) is given by
Φ(ν)(A)=νW (A)+( 1 − λ)
R
L×A×[θr,θH] lz(dl × dθr × dθf)
+
R
L×A×[θL,θr] lz(dl × dθr × dθf)
+λ
R




32for some arbitrary set A ∈ [θL,θH].F u r t h e r ,ν c a nb ed e c o m p o s e di n t o
ν(A)=νP (A)+νR (A)+νW (A).









lz(dl × dθr × dθf).
Further, the ﬁrst three branches of (2) are constant, thus implying that
ν(A) ≥ Φ(ν)(A)
in the ﬁrst order stochastic sense.¤
(ii) There exists a monotone sequence of distribution functions underlying {νt} called
Ft with the following property for some θL and θH:
Ft(θL)=0and Ft(θH)=1, for t = 1,2,...,
and by Corollary 2 to Theorem 12.9, (Helly’s Theorem) in Stokey, Lucas, Prescott (1989),
there exists a distribution function F with
F(θL)=0and F(θH)=1,
and {Ft} converges weakly to F.¤
Proposition 2a: The price for the industry’s product must decrease, at least weakly,
eventually, such that p(ν0) ≥ p(ν∗).
33Proof of Proposition 2a: Suppose that at time T, when the distribution is suﬃciently
close to ν∗,t h ep r i c ei sa b o v et h ep r i c ei nt h ei n i t i a lp e r i o d ,o r
p(νT) >p(ν0).
The distribution of knowledge is always improving, at least weakly, by part (i) of Proposition
1a. Then, since the cost of production is decreasing in knowledge, this implies that an
individual ﬁrm’s output at T cannot be lower than that at time 0. Further, if the price at time
T is above the initial price, agents who were not operating ﬁrms in the initial period will ﬁnd it
proﬁtable to enter and produce output. These two imply that aggregate output will be weakly
greater at time T than in the initial period. Demand is constant and downward sloping, so
an increase in aggregate output will decrease the price, which provides a contradiction.¤
We show that the competitive equilibrium deﬁned above is optimal. It is similar to
the methodology presented in Stokey, Lucas and Prescott (1989). First, we deﬁne the single
ﬁrm problem in which an aggregate ﬁrm maximizes producer surplus. Instead of individual
agents making decisions as to whether or not to operate a ﬁrm, where to work, how much to
produce and how much learning eﬀort to engage in, a single ﬁrm which treats these agents as
assets maximizes the total value of all these assets. This is done to eliminate the wages paid
by ﬁrms within the industry; only the price of the industry’s output and the outside wage
are important. We show that the allocations from the single ﬁrm equilibrium are equivalent
to the aggregate allocations from the competitive equilibrium. This is done in Lemma 2a.
Next, the planner’s problem is deﬁned explicitly. The planner maximizes both the
consumer and the producer surplus. Then, the competitive equilibrium is shown to be optimal
and unique in terms of price and aggregate allocations. In following the steps presented in
34Stokey, Lucas and Prescott (1989), the conditions that satisfy both the single ﬁrm problem
and the planner’s problem are shown to be equivalent. Since the competitive equilibrium and
the single ﬁrm equilibrium are equivalent, the competitive equilibrium is also optimal. The
equilibrium is unique, because demand is downward sloping and single-valued and the cost
function is decreasing in θ.





(pq (θ) − c(q (θ),θ))dνP (θ),
where the single ﬁrm is assumed to be a price taker with no monopoly power. The single
ﬁrm problem maximizes its total expected value over time given the law of motion of the
distribution of knowledge. It chooses a sequence of allocations {νPt,νRt,νWt,z t}
∞
t=0 along
with the price sequence, {pt}
∞








This sequence of allocations can be used to solve for the aggregate quantity of the industry’s
product, the total cost of production and the total amount of learning and imitation that
occurs. The single ﬁrm problem internalizes the value of each of the researchers by making
the future distribution a constraint of the problem instead of having the wage functions as
in the competitive case. Essentially each of the agents in the continuum are treated as if
they were assets owned by the aggregate ﬁrm. The equivalence between the competitive
equilibrium and the single ﬁrm equilibrium is given by the following lemma.
35Lemma 2a: The equilibrium aggregate allocations and the industry’s product price
from the single ﬁrm problem are equivalent to those in the competitive equilibrium.
Proof: We need to show that the aggregate allocations of producers, researchers and
workers are the same in both cases. These are the same since the single ﬁrm faces the same
incentives as the individual agents do in the competitive equilibrium. There are three cases
to be considered. The ﬁrst is the case where the single ﬁrm is choosing whether an individual
agent should work as a researcher or operate a productive unit. In this case, the ﬁrm
must weigh the return from production, the return from learning and imitation that occurs
when the agent operates a plant and the return from having this individual imitate a plant
operator’s knowledge and increasing that plant operator’s knowledge. In the competitive
equilibrium, the trade-oﬀ is the same since an agent who works as a researcher is paid a wage
that is both his marginal product from learning by his employer and the expected return
from imitating his employer’s knowledge, as shown in Proposition 2.
In the second case, the single ﬁrm weighs the return from having an individual agent
operate a plant or work outside the industry. In this case, the return from operating a
plant is the current proﬁts and the increase in the single ﬁrm’s knowledge from both learning
and imitation, and the return from working outside is the wage, given by W 0,a n dl e a v e s
the single ﬁrm’s knowledge unchanged. In the competitive case, the incentives are the same,
since the return from imitation is paid to an agent who chooses to incorporate, as shown in
Proposition 2.
In the ﬁnal case, the single ﬁrm must weigh the return from having an individual agent
work as a researcher or work outside the industry. Here the trade-oﬀ is between increasing the
36single ﬁrm’s knowledge by both learning and imitation and the wage from having the agent
work outside the industry. In the competitive case, the marginal beneﬁtf r o mi n c r e a s i n g
a ﬁrm’s knowledge is paid to the researcher and the expected return from imitating the
ﬁrm’s knowledge is paid by the researcher, so that the incentives and trade-oﬀs faced by an
individual agent are the same.¤























all feasible {νPt,νRt,νWt,z t}
∞
t=0 .



































t=0. First, we prove that if {νPt,νRt,νWt,z t}
∞
t=0 is a single
ﬁrm equilibrium, then {νPt,νRt,νWt,z t}
∞
t=0 is a surplus-maximizing allocation. Suppose that

























































































































νWt = 1 − νRt − νPt.
Hence, inequality (3a) contradicts (I3), which completes the proof.
Second, we prove that if {νPt,νRt,νWt,z t}
∞
t=0 is a surplus-maximizing allocation and
p is deﬁned by condition (I2),t h e n{νPt,νRt,νWt,z t}
∞







t=0,d e ﬁne f :[ 0 ,1] → < by
f (γ)=E

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38Since the surplus maximizing allocation occurs at {νPt,νRt,νWt,z t}
∞
t=0 by assumption, we




























































c(q,θ)dνPt− W oνRt − WoνPt
¢¢ª
,
which completes the proof. Since the competitive equilibrium and the single ﬁrm equilibrium
are equivalent by Lemma 2a, the competitive equilibrium is also Pareto optimal. Uniqueness
is established by the concavity of the cost function and the downward sloping, single valued
demand curve.¤
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y1: Note that the optimality of the competitive equilibrium does not
depend on what value λ takes on. The probability of not imitating is a social cost. Given the
option, the social planner would choose to set λ equal to one, so that the social cost would
be zero.¤
Lemma 3a: Any agent who does not become an entrepreneur in a given period and
does not learn her employer’s knowledge will not become an entrepreneur in the following
period.
Proof: Suppose the planner must assign tasks to two arbitrary agents with diﬀerent
levels of know-how. The ﬁrst agent, denoted by m, was assigned to work as a plant manager
in the previous period and has knowledge, given by θm, in the current period. Since the
39agent cannot forget by assumption, his knowledge is at least as good as in the previous
period. The second agent, u, did not operate a plant and has knowledge given by θu.H i s
knowledge is unchanged from the previous period. Further, let θm ≥ θu. The planner must
determine which of these agents will be assigned the position of managing a ﬁrm and which
will not. Suppose the planner chooses to have agent u manage a ﬁrm and agent m to either
work outside the industry or work as a researcher. In this case, the planner can improve
the total surplus in the economy by assigning agent m to manage a ﬁrm instead of agent
u. This improvement is a result of the increase in current proﬁts and the increase in future
knowledge. Since the cost of production is decreasing in knowledge, the proﬁts from having
agent m manage a plant will be higher than those from agent u, or
maxq {p(ν)q(θm) − c(q(θm),θm)}
> maxq {p(ν)q (θu) − c(q (θu),θu)}.
The current proﬁts are weakly higher if agent m operates a productive unit instead of agent
u. Next, we turn to the eﬀect on the future distribution of knowledge. The improvement in
future knowledge is from the assumption that the learning technology by the ﬁrm is increasing
in knowledge and that researchers may learn the plant manager’s knowledge. Since the set of
agents who have knowledge that is lower than θm is higher than those that have knowledge
that is lower than θu and the plant manager’s future knowledge is increasing in the plant
manager’s current knowledge, the future distribution will be higher if agent m is the plant
manager than if agent u is, or
λ
R





L×[θL,θu]×θu lz(dl × dθr × dθf)+
R
Ψ(Θ|l,θu)dz.
40As a result, the planner would choose to have agent m operate a plant instead of agent
u. Since the competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal, an agent who failed to improve his
knowledge from the previous period and did not operate a plant will not do so in the current
period. ¤
Proposition 3a: There exists a critical value ˜ θ deﬁned by
















such that if an agent has θ such that θ > ˜ θ, then that agent will become an entrepreneur.
Proof: The proof is shown in two steps. First, the return from not incorporating for
any arbitrary agent i with θi > ˜ θ is compared to that of an agent with ˜ θ. Next, the return
from incorporating for these types of agents is compared. Since the returns in the ﬁrst case
are equivalent and the returns to any arbitrary agent i i nt h es e c o n dc a s eo u t w e i g ht h o s et o
any agent with ˜ θ,a g e n ti will choose to operate a ﬁrm.
From Proposition 2, the return from working outside the industry must be equivalent
to that from working within the industry for any ﬁrm f with l(θf) > 0.I t i s s u ﬃcient
to consider only the case where an agent works outside the industry. By Lemma 1a, the
value function is non-decreasing in θ, so the present discounted value of working outside the
industry for agent i with θi > ˜ θ is at least equivalent to that of an agent with ˜ θ, or
W
o + βV (θi,Φ(ν)) ≥ W
o + βV (˜ θ,Φ(ν)).
Next, since both c(q,θ) and w(θ) are decreasing in θ and Ψ(θ
0 |l,θ) is increasing in θ,t h e































This establishes the result.¤
Lemma 4a: ˜ θ is weakly increasing, or ˜ θ(ν) ≤ ˜ θ(Φ(ν)).
Proof: By Lemma 3a, any agent who did not run a ﬁrm and failed to learn in the
previous period will not run a ﬁrm in the current period. This implies that the critical value,
˜ θ, is non-decreasing.¤
Lemma 5a: The value function is constant for θ ≤ ˜ θ.
Proof: Any agent i with θi ≤ ˜ θ, by Proposition 3a, will not run a plant. In fact, agent
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W o + βV (θi,Φ(ν)),
maxf∈[L,H]
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+(1 − λ)V (θi,Φ(ν))

 
], if θf ≥ θi
[w(θi,θf)+βV (θi,Φ(ν))], otherwise

          
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.
Lemma 3a states that any agent who works as a researcher and fails to learn her employer’s
know-how will not run a plant. This implies that the last term in each of the branches of the
42agent’s original value function can be replaced. By expanding the following period’s value
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[w(θi,θf)+βV (θi,Φ(Φ(ν)))], otherwise
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By expanding the value function using this for the continuation value, it is obvious that, since
˜ θ is weakly increasing, the eﬀect on θi can be made arbitrarily small.¤
Lemma 6a: The value function is increasing for θ > ˜ θ.
Proof: By Proposition 3a, all agents with θ > ˜ θ will run a production unit. So we
need only to consider the last branch of (1), or
V (θ,ν)=m a x
(q,l)
½







By assumption, the cost of production is decreasing in θ,o rdc/dθ < 0. By Corollary 1a,
t h ew a g ei sn o n - i n c r e a s i n gi nt h eﬁrm’s θ. By the assumptions on the innovative technology,
Ψ(θ
0 |l,θ) is increasing in θ. Together, these facts imply that the value function is increasing.¤
Proof of Proposition 4: Recall that ˜ θ is weakly increasing as shown in Lemma 4a. The
next period’s critical value is given by ˜ θ
0
. Consider the case of an agent who works for a ﬁrm
i with θi ≤ ˜ θ
0
. In the case where the agent fails to learn her employer’s θ, she will not run
43a production unit in the following period, by Lemma 3a. In the case where the agent does
learn her employer’s know-how and can imitate it, she will not run a production unit, since
her new technology will fall below the critical value. Next, consider the case of an agent who
works for a ﬁrm j with θj > ˜ θ
0
. In the case that she does learn her employer’s knowledge,
she will imitate her employer’s knowledge and run a production unit, since this knowledge
exceeds the critical value. Hence, λ of the ﬁrm’s employees will run a plant and imitate its
technological know-how.¤
Proof of Proposition 5: Here, we must show that for any two agents, i and j,w i t h
know-how, θi and θj, respectively, such that θi ≥ θj ≥ ˜ θ,
Pr{θ
0




j ≥ ˜ θ
0
}. (4)
There are two cases to consider. In the ﬁrst case, agent i’s current knowledge exceeds the
next period’s critical value for incorporating. In the second case, neither agent’s current
knowledge exceeds the next period’s critical value, and we must show that the probability
that agent i will innovate to a level that is higher than the next period’s critical value weakly
dominates the probability that agent j will.
We turn to the ﬁrst case. If θi ≥ ˜ θ
0
, then by assumption (iii) on the ﬁrm’s learning
function, θ
0




i ≥ ˜ θ
0
} = 1, and the result is established in this case.
Next, we consider the second case. If ˜ θ
0
> θi, inequality (1)i se q u i v a l e n tt o
(1 − F(˜ θ
0
|θi))G(l(θi)) ≥ (1 − F(˜ θ
0
|θj))G(l(θj)) (5)
where l(θi) and l(θj) denote the optimal labor choices. By assumption (iv), F(θ
0|θi) ﬁrst
order stochastically dominates F(θ
0|θj).A s u ﬃcient condition for inequality (1)t oh o l di s
G(l(θi)) ≥ G(l(θj)). This holds if l(θi) ≥ l(θj).
44A ﬁrm with know-how θi chooses l(θi) by maximizing







The ﬁrst order condition is
−w(θi) − βG








The ﬁrm with know-how θj solves a similar problem. Since ˜ θ
0
exceeds both θi and θj, if
either agent is unsuccessful at innovating, that agent does not run a ﬁrm in the following
period by Lemma 3a. By Lemma 5a, the value of an agent who does not run a ﬁrm is the
same, regardless of his know-how, so V (θi,Φ(ν)) = V (θj,Φ(ν)). Then equilibrium in the labor
market implies that w(θi)=w(θj). By Proposition 2, this wage must be equal to that paid
to agents who work outside, W 0.
Given that both the value of failing to learn and the wages paid by these agents are













This inequality holds, since F(θ
0
i|θi) ﬁrst order stochastically dominates F(θ
0
j|θj) and, by
Lemma 1a, V (θ
0,Φ(ν)) is weakly increasing in θ
0.¤
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47Table 1. Spin-outs, Parents, Founding Years, and Life Spans
Spin-Out Parent(s) Founding Yr. Life Span
International Memories Memorex 1977 8, Exited
Micropolis Pertec 1977 19, Acquired
Dastek IBM 1978 3, Acquired
Priam Memorex 1978 12, Exited
Irwin International
Industries, Inc.
Sycor 1979 3, Acquired
Seagate Shugart Associates 1979 18, Still Active
Computer Memories Pertec 1980 6, Exited
Ibis Burroughs, Memorex 1980 10, Exited
Miniscribe Storage Technology Corp. 1980 10, Acquired (by Maxtor)
Quantum Shugart Associates 1980 17, Still Active
Rodime Burroughs 1980 11, Exited
Rotating Memory Systems Shugart Associates,
Memorex
1980 2, Acquired
Amcodyne Storage Technology Corp. 1981 5, Acquired
Atasi International Memories 1981 6, Acquired
Evotek Memorex, Data General 1981 2, Exited
Tecstor Microdata 1981 6, Acquired
Applied Information
Memories
Ibis 1982 3, Exited
Cogito IBM 1982 6, Exited
Maxtor Quantum 1982 14, Acquired
Microcomputer Memories Alpha Data 1982 5, Exited
Microscience International Datapoint 1982 10, Exited
Syquest Seagate 1982 15, Still Active
Vertex Peripherals Shugart Associates 1982 3, Acquired (by Priam)
Lapine Irwin International 1983 4, Exited
Tulin Ampex, Qume 1983 5, Exited
Epelo Atasi 1984 1, Exited
Josephine County
Technology
Tandon 1984 4, Exited
Micro Storage Corp. Syquest 1984 2, Exited
Peripheral Technology Computer Memories 1985 2, Acquired
Brand Technologies Computer Memories 1986 6, Exited
Conner Peripherals Seagate, Miniscribe 1986 10, Acquired (by Seagate)
PrairieTek Miniscribe 1986 5, Exited
Comport Lapine 1987 3, Exited
Kalok Lapine 1987 7, Acquired
Areal Technology Maxtor 1988 3, Acquired
Ecol.2 Areal Technology 1990 1, Exited
Integral Peripherals PrairieTek 1990 7, Still Active
Orca Technology Maxtor, Priam 1990 2, Exited
MiniStor Maxtor 1991 4, Exited
Gigastorage International Aura Associates 1993 4, Still Active
The exit date is the date the firm stops manufacturing and selling new drives. Spin-outs either exit through failure (denoted by
exited in the life span column), are acquired (denoted by acquired), or are still active as of 1997 (denoted by still active). If the
firm was acquired by another spin-out, we note the acquiring firm.Table 2. The Early Movers, by Diameter
(firms are in alphabetical order in each category)
Diameter Early Mover Introduction Date
8” BASF Q4, 1979
IBM Q1, 1979
International Memories Q1, 1979
Micropolis Q4, 1979
New World Computer Q3, 1979
Pertec Q4, 1979
Shugart Associates Q4, 1979
5.25” Computer Memories Q2, 1981
International Memories Q1, 1981
New World Computer Q3, 1980
Rodime Q2, 1981
Rotating Memory Systems Q2, 1981
Seagate Q3, 1980
Tandon Q4, 1980
3.5” Control Data Q3, 1983
Microcomputer Memories Q1, 1984
Microscience International Q2, 1984
Rodime Q3, 1983
2.5” PrairieTek Q4, 1988
1.8” Integral Peripherals Q3, 1991
An early mover is defined to be a firm that introduces a drive in the diameter within 3 quarters after the
first introduction. The Introduction Date is the date the product was first shipped. Announced products
that were still in the development stage, and had not shipped, are not included.Table 3. Imitation of Early-mover Know-how in the Period 1977-1997











Pertec, 8” Computer Memories YES, 5.25”
Micropolis YES, 8”
PrairieTek, 2.5” Integral Peripherals YES, 1.8”
Seagate, 5.25” Conner Peripherals NO
Syquest NO, (but was the first mover in
4” removable cartridge drives)
Shugart Associates, 8” Quantum NO
Rotating Memory Systems YES, 5.25”
Seagate YES, 5.25”
Vertex Peripherals NO
Tandon, 5.25” Josephine County Technology NO
Table 4. Summary Statistics
Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum Cases
Technical Know-How 0.44 0.25 0.0084 1.00 1039
Lagged Technical Know-How 0.45 0.24 0.0084 1.00 877
Early-Mover Know-How 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 1190
Lagged Number of Drives 11.31 15.06 1.00 119 886
Lagged Sales Growth 0.21 0.65 -2.00 2.00 846
U.S. Firm Dummy 0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00 1190
Spin-Out Generation Dummy 0.032 0.18 0.00 1.00 1190
Survival Dummy 0.91 0.29 0.00 1.00 1172
Definitions of technical know-how, early-mover know-how, and sales growth are provided in the text.
Technical Know-How and Lagged Technical Know-How range from 0 to 1. Early-Mover Know-How
is a dummy variable. Lagged Sales Growth ranges from -2 to 2.
Lagged Number of Drives measures the number of drives produced by the firm in the previous period.
The U.S. Firm Dummy takes the value 1 if the firm is an American firm, and 0 otherwise. The Spin-
Out Generation Dummy takes the value 1 if the firm generates a spin-out in the current period, and 0
otherwise. The Survival Dummy takes the value 0 if the firm exits through failure in the following
period, and 1 otherwise.Table 5. The Probability of Generating a Spin-Out as a Function of Know-How
Probit Model (Standard Errors in Parentheses)






















































































The dependent variable is the spin-out generation dummy.
*Significant at the 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level.
When year dummies are included, 1983 is the base year.Table 6. The Probability of Surviving to the Following Period as a Function of
Know-How









































Number of Observations 918
Log Likelihood -301.41
The dependent variable is the survival dummy. It is 0 if the firm exits through failure in the following
period, and 1 otherwise.
*Significant at the 10% level.
**Significant at the 5% level.
***Significant at the 1% level.
When year dummies are included, 1983 is the base year.Table 7 The Probability of Surviving to the Following Period as a Function of
Know-How - Spin-Outs Only
Probit Model (Standard Errors in Parentheses)














Parent Technical Know-How - -1.36**
(0.62)













































Number of Observations 184 150
Log Likelihood -57.99 -40.13
The dependent variable is the survival dummy. It is 0 if the firm exits through failure in the following
period, and 1 otherwise.
*Significant at the 10% level.
**Significant at the 5% level.
***Significant at the 1% level.
When year dummies are included, 1983 is the base year.Table 8. Summary Statistics on Spin-outs
Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum Cases
Spin-Out Life Span 6.60 4.80 1.00 19.00 40
Parent Technical Know-How 0.57 0.28 0.053 1.00 34
Average Parent Technical Know-
How in the 3 years surrounding the
spin-out’s entry
0.48 0.23 0.019 1.00 38
Parent Early-Mover Know-How 0.39 0.50 0.00 1.00 40
Parent Sales Growth in the 3 years
surrounding the spin-out’s entry
0.085 0.67 -1.86 1.6 38
Entrepreneur Dummy 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 40
Number of Censored Observations 19
Parent Technical Know-How and Average Parent Technical Know-How range from 0 to 1. Parent
Early-Mover Know-How is a dummy variable. Parent Sales Growth ranges from –2 to 2. The
Entrepreneur Dummy is a dummy variable.
The Censored Observations are spin-outs that have either been acquired or are still active at the end of
the sample.
Table 9. Spin-out Life Span as a Function of Parent Know-how
Duration Model using Weibull Specification (Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Equation 9a. Equation 9b. Equation 9c. Equation 9d.









Parent Technical Know-How -0.71
(0.64)
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Know-How in the 3 years







Parent Sales Growth in the 3
















Number of Observations 34 38 38 38
Log Likelihood -33.03 -36.20 -33.55 -33.26
The dependent variable is the spin-out’s life span (from Table 1).
The definitions of technical know-how, early mover know-how, other know-how, and the entrepreneur
dummy are discussed in the text.
*Significant at the 10% level.
**Significant at the 5% level.
***Significant at the 1% level.